Elizabeth Anscombe's *Intention*, published in 1957,¹ is a book of only ninety-four pages, but crafted with great care and wasting no words, it develops a profound, original, and remarkably comprehensive account of intentional action and the concepts that circle round it. It is, wrote Donald Davidson, "the most important treatment of action since Aristotle,"² an admiration shared by the authors of the essays in this volume. That kind of admiration for Anscombe's book has been slow in coming. The book did not fall stillborn from the press, but it was not generally recognized as a work of great phi Anscombe and Davidson on Practical Knowledge: A Reply to Hunter. ald Davidson and Elizabeth Anscombe were in basic agreement about practical knowledge. In this reply, it is my contention that Hunter's fascinating claim may not be satisfactorily warranted. To throw light on why, a more careful consideration of the role of the notion of practical knowledge in Anscombe's approach to intentional action is undertaken. The result indicates a possible need to distinguish between what is called 'practical knowledge' and '(non-observational) knowledge of what one is doing', and shows that Hunter's claim concerning the closeness of Anscombe to Davidson only has plausibility for knowledge of what one is doing. Contrary to an interesting suggestion by Hunter, the paper argues that it is hard to see how Davidson's position can benefit substantially from making use of the notion of knowledge of what one is doing.

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