Quine or wittgenstein: the end of analytic philosophi
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Abstract
This paper deals with the question whether science and philosophy are continuous, as Quine thought, or whether they are completely separated, as Wittgenstein held. Reconstructing the reasons why the latter kept a sharp distinction between science and philosophy, it examines the attempts of the former to resolve philosophical problems in scientific terms. It maintains that Quine’s scientism is misconceived and presents further reasons for making a distinction (if not a separation) between science and philosophy.

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For fifty years, Willard Van Orman Quine's books and articles have stimulated intense debate in the fields of logic and the philosophy of language. Many scholars in fact, regard Quine as the greatest living English-speaking philosopher; yet his views remain widely misunderstood and misinterpreted. It presents Quine's difficult later views in an accessible fashion, bringing out as no other study has the very radical nature of his position. One of the book's highlights is its careful examination and assessment of Tarski's theory of truth as it relates to the traditions of Russell and Wittgenstein and to Quine’s own philosophy. This book grew out of his dissertation with the active criticism and support of Quine himself. Part of the History of Analytic Philosophy book series (History of Analytic Philosophy). Abstract. During the early decades of the Twentieth Century many philosophers, W.V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein among them, repudiated what they deemed the pretentions of past philosophy, in particular the assumption that there is knowledge about the
world deeper than the deliverances of science and common sense. Attempts to provide information about what really exists, really happens, really matters were judged misguided and metaphysical and epistemological theorizing in all its manifestations decried.